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Abstract 
This paper uses detailed cross country and over time data to show that despite various 
limitations, the QIZs of Jordan and subsequently Egypt, along with certain US FTAs, have 
contributed significantly to an increase in participating countries’ shares of exports to the US in 
the nine most common categories of clothing items for which the effects of tariff and quota 
exemptions are likely to be strongest. These influences, although perhaps diminishing after a 
certain period of time, are stronger than those of exchange rate, transport cost and changes in 
openness over time. What is perhaps most surprising is that these effects are quite clearly 
discernable even in the case of Jordan despite its lack of relevant raw materials and prior 
industrial experience.  The results also demonstrate the very significant effects exercised by 
quotas and their phasing out on the changing country shares in US imports of the selected 
commodities.  
 
I. Introduction and Objectives 
 
In response to continuing failure of the nations of the world to successfully negotiate 
trade liberalization treaties at a global level through the World Trade Organization, countries 
have increasingly turned to regional agreements involving Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 
Customs Unions (CUs) and various other trade programs providing at least some degree of 
mutually privileged access with varying numbers of other countries. While these regional or 
otherwise smaller scale trade arrangements have proliferated around the world in the last twenty-
five years, the United States has been something of a leader in the number of trade agreements it 
has struck.  
Prior to the mid -1980s, the US held to the importance of liberalization at the world level 
and deliberately chose not to engage in any of these so-called “discriminatory” trading 
arrangements. Nevertheless from the time of its first Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1985 
the US has signed trade agreements with over 35 countries and has several additional ones in 
various stages of negotiation, including some involving relatively large numbers of countries.  
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While each of these arrangements have had their own rationale, often political as well as 
economic, the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) agreements the US signed with Jordan in 1997 
and Egypt in 2004 are especially unique. These agreements granted free access to the US market 
for goods produced in certain specified and approved zones within participating countries, 
conditional on specified minimal percentages of the value added being supplied by Israeli firms.
1
 
The motivation for the QIZ agreements was largely to offer some economic benefit to these 
countries, which in the mid- 1990s were struggling with debt and other burdens, as a reward for 
having signed peace treaties with Israel. It was hoped that in this way the QIZs would contribute 
to some normalization of relations between each of these countries and Israel. Both Arab 
countries had been in armed conflict with Israel on several occasions in the past. The QIZs were 
not separate treaties but mere extensions of the existing Free Trade Agreement between the US 
and Israel allowing for tariff and quota exemptions on imports from designated zones in Egypt 
and Jordan as long as these imports satisfied the minimum specified percentages of inputs from 
Israel.   
Because US FTAs grant preferential access to the US market, it seems like the 
continuous proliferation these agreements would dilute the associated benefits. In the case of 
those countries with relatively low incomes, the opportunities for exporting to the US are largely 
limited to labor intensive commodities, and especially those in which US tariff rates are also 
relatively high. Garments or clothing are the prime example of imported products satisfying both 
such characteristics and explaining why the goods exported to the US from the QIZs of Jordan 
and Egypt have been almost exclusively restricted to a relatively small number of clothing items 
with relatively high tariff rates (in the 20-25% range). But, since Jordan had no production of the 
cotton or wool raw materials or the cloth intermediate goods used in producing clothing, it would 
be natural to doubt that its QIZ would be able to generate much in the way of exports to the US. 
An additional barrier to success in export generation to the QIZs could be the difficulty of 
developing cooperative relationships between Israeli firms and those of Jordan and Egypt.  
US FTAs with countries like Canada, Mexico, Chile and those of Central America, most 
of which had well-developed manufacturing activities prior to the creation of FTAs with the US, 
offer little insight into the magnitudes of the export promotion benefits of FTAs for other 
                                                 
1
 These minimal percentages were originally set at 35 percent of the minimum value added to quality for such 
preferences. Over time, these percentages were adjusted downward by mutual consent first for Jordan and later for 
Egypt.  
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countries with little prior industrial experience. A better source of comparison would be the 
numerous Sub-Saharan African countries that gained access to the US market in textiles and 
clothing under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) after the year 2000. 
In the case of the QIZs, important effects going beyond those of trade creation would 
include those on employment in general, (and female employment in particular), investment and 
FDI, industrial output and, of course, peace and normalization (Nugent and Abdel Latif, 2011) 
provide an early attempt at such an evaluation of these other effects based on data through about 
2007, not all of which are very substantial. This study, by contrast, confines its attention strictly 
to the exports of nine six- digit SITC codes to which the exports of Jordan and Egypt under the 
QIZ have been largely limited.  These same categories are also among the most important ones 
exported to the US by many other FTA-like trade partners and other exporters of garments to the 
US. For this reason, our analysis is limited to explaining observed changes over time in the 
country shares in US imports of these same nine garments in a sample of 38 countries with the 
largest shares in US imports of these commodities. The sample includes countries that had been 
subject to quotas on the various garments, those with QIZ, FTA and other preferential trade 
access, as well as those not subject to either quotas or preferential access. We take into 
consideration the dates at which any country in the sample became engaged in a preferential 
trading arrangement with the US that applied to such products and to the quotas that once applied 
to some of the exporters in the sample, the phasing out of these quotas and differences therein 
across countries, changes in transport costs from a key port in the exporting country to the 
nearest large port in the US, and exchange rate changes.  
The key questions we attempt to answer in this paper are the following: (1) Can we 
identify statistically significant effects of the QIZ, AGOA and other FTAs on the country shares 
in US imports of these commodities? (2) If so, are such effects subject to significant changes 
over time (strengthening or weakening)?  (3) Can we separate out the effects of the phasing out 
of the quotas on such imports? (4) Similarly, can we identify any diminishing influences due to 
the proliferation in the number of countries benefitting from these preferential relationships over 
time?    
 
II. Background and initiation of the QIZs and Relevant Literature 
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Little is known about the details of the QIZs, in part because it has been limited in scope 
(applicable to a relatively small number of factories in special zones of the countries involved), 
but also because doing business with former enemies has been treated as confidential by many 
Arabs participating in it and therefore largely hidden from the population at large. Yet, since the 
experience is unique, initiated in an especially conflicted area, and is still ongoing and potentially 
applicable elsewhere, the lessons of this experience deserve attention. This is especially so for 
two reasons: (1) civil and international conflicts have been a major contributor to failed states 
and development traps, the very conditions that have locked the people of many regions into 
poverty and repeated conflicts for decade after decade (Collier, 2007), and (2) surprisingly little 
attention has been given to the potential role of joint or mutually beneficial businesses in 
promoting both material gain and peace among people coming from conflict-prone countries.
2
  
Conflicts between Israel, on the one hand, and the occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan 
and Egypt, on the other, have been important since these countries have been involved in as 
many as five wars with each other (1948-9, 1956, 1967, 1973-4, and to a lesser extent 1982). 
Israel and the Palestinian territories, moreover, have been engaged in intermittent conflicts for 
over 80 years as recently as summer 2014 (the conflict in Gaza). This conflict lies at the center of 
virtually all the other conflicts in the Middle East. This history of conflict goes a long way 
toward explaining why the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has long been identified as a 
region with the lowest level of intra-regional trade in the world (Farshbaf and Nugent, 2013)  
The creation of an independent Israeli state surrounded by Arab countries left Israel quite 
isolated from its neighbors. Yet, with its highly educated population, commercially and 
professionally skilled workers, and international capital, Israel’s economy grew rapidly, much 
more rapidly than its less developed Arab neighbors. Its growth was boosted by a number of 
factors, including its FTA with the United States in 1985, a number of institutional reforms, 
including reductions in the share of military spending in its budget, and the influx of highly 
skilled immigrants from Russia in the 1990s (Sagi, 1999). One result of Israel’s rapid growth in 
per capita income was upward pressure on wage rates, especially after the resumption of 
violence with Palestinians on the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (the first Intifada) which resulted in effective closing of the inflow of 
                                                 
2
 Note, for example, that the rather comprehensive study of the World Bank (2011) made no reference to business- 
initiated peace-making activities.   
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Palestinian workers into Israel (Arrnon and Weinblatt, 2001). These rising wage rates threatened 
the survival of its clothing industry which early on had been a leading one and very export-
oriented and labor intensive, implying that it was increasingly vulnerable to competition from 
low wage countries like China and others.  
The first Intifada and Israel’s reactions to it led to such large losses in human life on both 
sides of the conflict to stimulate renewed diplomatic efforts (by both the two sides and the 
international community to reach a peaceful solution via the Oslo Accord followed by a 
Presidential Agreement between Israel and the WBG on “Cooperation in the field of trade, 
including studies and Trade Promotion Programs” whose purpose was to encourage local, 
regional and inter-regional trade, and even a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the 
Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to 
trade and commerce. One significant advantage of this agreement was to be the creation of trade 
zones on Israel’s borders with both the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) so that Palestinian workers 
could enter from one side, Israeli managers and materials from the other side, greatly reducing 
the security risk to Israel of Palestinian workers transiting daily into Israel itself. This was 
followed by the Paris Protocol of 1994 which sought to establish new trade relations between 
Israel and WBG intended to rectify some of the problems that had existed since the 1967 
occupation. What is clear is that the new scheme did not work well and eventually relations 
between these two parties deteriorated sufficiently that, after an unfortunate incident in 2000, 
conflict erupted again (Second Intifada). Since then, no real progress has been made on the trade, 
employment and peace fronts between Israel and the WBG. 
The effects of the peace initiatives went beyond the Palestinian territories. Because of the low 
oil prices of the late 1980s and 1990s and its close relation with Iraq, Jordan found itself deeply 
indebted and inundated with the rather massive return of its many nationals who had migrated to the 
Gulf countries for employment and business opportunities, contributing to a surge in unemployment 
rates and depressed economic conditions. As a heavily indebted country itself, Jordan became unable to 
meet its own international obligations and had to undergo debt rescheduling and a strict IMF 
stabilization program (Kanaan,1999). Under the heavy pressures of its budget deficits and debt, and its 
economic troubles, the Jordanian government decided to try the peace route in order to stimulate its 
economy and take advantage of a widely anticipated peace dividend. 
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Jordan signed a peace agreement with Israel on October 26, 1994. Although the anticipated 
peace dividend did not materialize in terms of new large regional infrastructure or other projects, a 
Regional Business Council to foster meetings of businessmen from Israel, WBG and Jordan was 
established (Al_Khouri and Kardoosh, 2004). Out of these meetings there did emerge some joint 
business relations and in particular one between Omar Saleh, a young Jordanian of Palestinian heritage, 
and Dov Lautman, an already very successful Israeli businessman in the textiles industry (who had 
served not only as Chairman of the Israel Manufacturers Association for a number of years and as the 
Special Representative of the Prime Minister for advancement of foreign investment and economic 
development. By February 1996 Saleh had established a firm with Lautman in Northern Jordan to 
which Lautman transferred some of his production in England to take advantage of lower labor costs 
(Carroll, 2003).  As early as late 1995, Saleh was already at work lobbying for support in the United 
States for a QIZ with Jordan and Israel, trying to get the United States to offer free access for 
production like his with Israeli inputs.  
Although Egypt had signed its peace agreement with Israel well over a decade earlier (1979) 
and a significant amount of trade had arisen between the two countries, in the early 1990s both Israel 
and Egypt felt that they had paid an extremely high price for their Peace Treaty. Israel’s loss came by 
way of its withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982 just before oil and gas were discovered there. Egypt’s loss 
derived from the severe sanctions imposed on it by its fellow Arab countries for having signed a peace 
treaty with Israel without prior Israeli withdrawal from WBG. Continuing difficulties between Israel 
and Palestinians in the WBG and Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem further discouraged any 
possible initiatives on the part of the Egyptian government to expand cooperation with Israel. Given the 
much better outcome for Egypt of the Gulf War (including debt forgiveness), moreover, Egypt was also 
much less needy than Jordan of any commercial benefits that might arise from further cooperation with 
Israel.  
Meanwhile back in the United States, prompted in part by the interest that had been instilled by 
Salah and others in October 1995, and cognizant of the need for the US to contribute further to peace in 
the Middle East, “on 13 March 1996, US Congressman Philip Crane from Illinois introduced a bill (HR 
3074) to amend the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985. The amendment 
would provide the US President with authority to extend the US-Israel free trade area to cover articles 
grown, produced, or manufactured in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or a QIZ between Israel and 
Jordan or Israel and Egypt” (Al- Khouri and Kardoosh 2004 p10).  
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Quite remarkably, the US House and Senate passed the proposed amendment to the US-Israel 
FTA in just a few months. It set no deadlines, time limits, or renewal requirements, implementation 
being at the President’s discretion. While Israel’s interest in the QIZ arrangements were clearly to 
foster normalized relations and to help save at least some of its textile industry, to come into effect it 
required a similar interest by Palestinians, Egyptians or Jordanians.   
Thanks in large part to the interest of enterprising businessmen, including the aforementioned 
Omar Saleh, the response in Jordan was more positive than in Egypt where the economic situation was 
less desperate. Because of its high unemployment rate, the very underdeveloped state of its 
manufacturing sector and low female labor force participation rate, Jordan’s King and top government 
officials also saw potential economic benefits in a QIZ that would help to preserve political and 
economic stability. Yet, general public opinion and even that of other businessmen in Jordan, were 
quite negative to the proposed QIZ. For this reason, Jordan’s negotiations with Israel and the US on the 
QIZ were tedious, prolonged and conducted behind closed doors. The eventual signing took place only 
in late 1997, outside the country (in Qatar). The agreement called for the initiation of a first QIZ in 
Irbid (Northern Jordan). This zone opened in March 1998 and included the textile plants developed by 
Salah and other businessmen.   
Even after the initiation of the QIZ, other Jordanian businessmen continued to express their 
opposition to it and those engaged in it had to survive the threats against them by various opponents 
within Jordan. These included a prominent business association and especially an Anti-Normalization 
Committee, which went so far as to blacklist Salah’s and other companies in the QIZ because they saw 
them as a vehicle for forcing Jordanians to buy Israeli goods. To mitigate the need for ugly public 
debate, the agreement was ratified by a Royal Decree (not by Parliament)
3
. As a result, firms like those 
of Saleh involved in the QIZs found it prudent to keep their Israeli connections quite private, primarily 
working through internationally based multinational enterprises (Carroll, 2003).  
Yet, over time, 14 more QIZs were created in different parts of Jordan, including on its border 
with Israel. In each QIZ a number of companies were set up and a fair amount of FDI was attracted to 
the country and employment created. The US was sufficiently impressed with Jordan’s efforts to take 
advantage of the QIZ, to open up its economy and to undertake complementary economic reforms that 
by 2001, it negotiated a separate FTA with Jordan. This would allow all imports of Jordanian goods to 
                                                 
3
 The fact that over half of Jordan’s population is made up of Palestinians, many of them families displaced from their 
homes in the creation of Israel and subsequent Arab-Israeli War, contributes to the sensitivity within Jordan to cooperation 
with Israel.   
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be imported free of tariffs and quotas by 2010, even without having to satisfy the minimal percentage 
of Israeli input as under the QIZ.  
While originally Egypt had refused to join a QIZ with Israel and the US, after seeing the rapid 
growth of Jordan’s exports to the US and the fact that Jordan’s involvement was rewarded by 
eventually obtaining its own FTA with the US, by 2004 Egypt agreed to have its own QIZ with Israel 
and the US. The Egyptian QIZ came into effect in 2005, a process that was again encouraged by some 
close business relations and also the support of Egyptian labor interests. Yet, public opinion in Egypt to 
these business relations with Israeli firms was no more positive than in Jordan and hence information 
about these relations was almost equally non-transparent.  
As mentioned in the introduction, for developing countries, it is the labor intensive products 
with high tariffs (and until 2005 also subject to import quotas) that would presumably most benefit 
from the ability to enter the US without tariffs or quotas as is the case for FTAs an d QIZs. Indeed, in 
the case of the QIZs of Jordan and Egypt, US imports from their QIZs have been confined almost 
exclusively to a relatively small number of products (mostly T-shirts and other cotton garments) 
produced by labor intensive techniques and subject to high tariffs and until 2005 also quotas. While the 
shares of imports into the US from these various countries with and without FTAs vary considerably 
across countries, over time and, to some extent, from one commodity to another, we limit our focus to 
those nine commodities which are most important for Jordan, Egypt and other developing countries 
exporting to the US.  
 
III. Data and Empirical Model      
 
The nine commodities identified for study are those identified by the six-digit HS codes  
610462, 610469, 610610, 610910, 611420, 620342, 620452, 620462 and 621142 in the classification 
system of the UN Comtrade Database. The data obtained are for the years 1990-2012 for which rather 
complete data on imports into the US were available for each commodity on each of 38 major exporters 
to the US of these commodities. The samples of both countries and of commodities are identified in 
Appendix Table 1. As noted in that table, the countries include QIZ partners Jordan and Egypt, several 
members of AGOA, Israel and 18 other countries with FTAs with the US, China and 11 other countries 
which were subject to import quotas on clothing imports into the US.  
For every commodity and country included, the absolute value of imports into the US of that 
commodity were obtained for each year from the UN Comtrade Database and then divided by the total 
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imports of the same commodity and year. These were then multiplied by 100 so as to generate the 
shares in percentage terms of each country in the total imports of that commodity in the US.  For the 
explanatory variables, we identified dummy variables indicating years for which any FTA or other 
preferential agreement was in effect, as well as different variables distinguishing the QIZ and AGOA 
and other non FTAs from the full-fledged FTAs, the number of years that such arrangements was in 
effect and the same for quotas in each calendar year under study. For quotas we also identified 
dummies for the phase-out and distinguished between the data at which the quotas were ended because 
the quotas for China on imports into the US were retained longer than those for the other countries with 
quotas.  
Data for the exchange rates by country and year were obtained from XRAT in the Penn 
World Tables data set. Data on Openness (OPEN) measured by the shares of Exports plus 
Imports in GDP, all in nominal values were taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, and the United Nations Statistical Office data bases. Data on shipping costs and 
changes therein over time were obtained by combining data from several sources: (1) fuel oil 
costs for maritime transport by year from World Development Indicators, (2) the distance 
between the largest port in the shipping country and the nearest port of entry into the US, (3) the 
estimated average shipping time between the two ports via container shipping (from 
http://searates.com/reference/portdistance) and “container tracking service” and (4) over time 
from 1991 ad valorem- equivalent transport costs divided by the total import value  at the six 
digit HS code from the set of 218 countries over time from the Maritime Transport Cost 
Database of the OECD. (following guidelines in Korinek, Jane 2011 “Clarifying Trade Costs in 
Maritime Transport” OECD, Paris). Finally, to capture the possible dilution effects as the 
number of countries with preferential access to the US market has increased over time, we have 
constructed a variable labeled NFTA as the number of countries with preferential access to the 
US in clothing imports in each year compiled from information available on the website of the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (https://ustr.gov).  
For estimation purposes, we convert the country and commodity specific shares to logs and then 
construct the changes in the natural logs of these shares (d_log_shares) which serve as the dependent 
variable in our analysis. All data are pooled across commodities and countries. On the premise that as 
in standard neoclassical growth models, the higher is any given country’s initial share (aged two years) 
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(lag2Shares) the lower will be the expected rise in its share in the current year, the estimating equation 
becomes:  
d_log_sharesijt = α + β1 lag2Sharesijt + β2 yrsTAit +β3 sq_yrsTAit + β4 lagCTANFTAt + β5EndQuotait      
+ β6 RegularQuotaVariationit   + β7 ChinaQuotaVariationit +  β8 Xit   +εi  + εj  +i εt + εijt             (1) 
   
where X is a vector of other control variable including (a) the change in Openness (d_log_open), the 
change in transport cost (d_log_transport) and the lagged change in the real exchange rate 
(lagdXRAT) , and εi , εj  and εt represent fixed effects for country, commodity and time, respectively 
and εijt represents the random error term. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
  Descriptive Statistics on all variables in our model are given in Table 1. From the number of 
observations by variable it can be seen that the full pooled cross section over time would give us 7524 
observations but, by moving to first differences and allowing for two lags, the sample is reduced to 
6840 observations. While the change variables (in shares, in openness, in transport costs and in real 
exchange rates) can be either positive or negative, the average of the changes in shares is near zero. All 
the variables relating to time in place (the various trade agreements, EndQuota, and the increase in the 
number of countries receiving preferential access to the US market) have values bounded from below at 
zero with varying upper bounds. The variables representing changes in natural logs range from negative 
to positive values and reflect considerable change over time and across countries. 
 We present three tables of empirical results along the lines of equation (1). The first (Table 2) 
treats all countries with preferential access to the US market for garments as if they were the same 
except for their timing. In Table 3 the QIZs, and all the countries gaining access to the US market via 
AGOA are distinguished from those gaining such access under more full-fledged Free Trade 
Agreements. The latter often provide somewhat deeper integration benefits, such as the specification of 
common rules for dispute resolution, environmental protection or other features. Since in Table 3, the 
effects of years that AGOA had been in effect (yrsAGOA) had no significant effects on d_log_shares, 
in Table 4 we omit the yrsAGOA variables. Yet, in Table 4 we now distinguish between the Egyptian 
and Jordanian QIZs, since one might suppose that because of Egypt’s (a) longer experience in the 
clothing industry, (b) larger supply of local raw materials and (c) lower wage rates, that Egypt’s yrsQIZ 
might have larger effects than those of yrsJordanQIZ.  
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 Turning first to Table 2 with the most general specification, we find as expected, in columns 
(1), (3) and (5) negative and significant effects of the lagged levels of the shares of each specific six-
digit commodity group, positive and significant effects of yrsTA (but small negative effects of 
sq_yrsTA). We also find rather strong negative effects of EndQuota on all the countries not subject to 
quotas when quotas were phased out and positive effects of Regular QuotaVariation on those countries 
that had been subject to quotas when these were phased out and negative effects on China 
ChinaQuotaVariation during the slightly longer period in which it was subject to quotas. We find a 
weak positive influence of the change in openness (d_log_open) and no significant effects of either 
lagged changes in the real exchange rates or the country specific changes in transport costs. Not 
surprisingly, because the many country, commodity and year specific shocks which could affect these 
changes in shares, but which are not accounted for in the model, the adjusted values of R
2 
are uniformly 
low. Somewhat more surprising is that the change in the number of countries with preferential access to 
the US (lagCTANFTA) has no significant effect on the share changes (d_log_shares). While the 
coefficients of the quota variables are all considerably larger than those of the years in which the 
respective trade agreements were in effect, it must be realized that these effects rise with each passing 
year (at least up to a peak) whereas the quota related variables are all once and for all changes.  
 Columns (1) and (5) Table 3 shows that all the previous findings from Table 2 are retained.  
When instead of yrsTA representing the effects of all trade agreements of the US in the sample, we 
include only the QIZs (ysQIZ and sqyrs_QIZ) as in column (2), the separate effects of these terms are 
statistically significant and even larger in magnitudes than the yrsTA in Table 2 or in column (1) of 
Table 3. This would seem to suggest that the Free Trade Agreements that the US has with several 
countries (e.g., Australia, Chile, Oman) were by no means designed to provide such exporters to the US 
with special advantages in these specific items of clothing, but have had a greater influence in these 
commodities in the case of the QIZs. From columns (3)-(5), however, there is little sign that the AGOA 
countries in the sample have benefitted significantly from such preferential access.
4
   
 The results of Table 4 show that all the effects of the quotas and other variables in the model are 
quite robust across the different specifications in the table and consistent with those in the preceding 
tables. By comparing the effects of the Egyptian QIZ in column (1) with those for the Jordanian QIZ in 
column (3) it can be seen that counter to our expectation, the effects of the Jordanian QIZ seem to be 
                                                 
4
 The results in Column (5) are supportive of these the differences in the effects of these different agreements on the 
shares of US imports of the 9 commodities under study, but because of built in collinearity between the years in 
effect of these different agreements the significance of the individual coefficients is reduced substantially.   
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larger and more statistically significant than those of Egypt. In both cases, however, the same nonlinear 
pattern is evident, the linear terms being positive and quite large and the squared terms small but 
negative. In both cases the peak gain would seem to be reached after approximately 10 years.  Given 
our reasons for expecting the trade creation effects to be stronger in these commodities for Egypt than 
for Jordan, the somewhat opposite finding in Table 4 is indeed something of a surprise and deserves 
further discussion and effort to corroborate these findings.  
To the latter end, Table 5 shows time series data on the averages across the same nine 
commodities of the shares of Jordan and Egypt in US imports in the first two columns for the period 
1992-2012. Then, in the next two columns it presents aggregate data on all US imports from Jordan and 
Egypt, respectively. This data is from an alternative but also very reliable source, namely, the foreign 
trade statistics of the US Census Bureau. These figures are not confined to those imports coming into 
the US from the QIZs themselves (and of course are no longer confined to clothing) but they do cover 
roughly the same time period. The growth of the average shares across the nine commodities in the first 
two columns does show that Jordan’s shares started at much lower levels than those of Egypt but grew 
especially rapidly after the initiation of its QIZ in 1998, surpassing the share of Egypt by 2001. 
Jordan’s average shares peaked however in 2005 at precisely the time that Egypt’s QIZ was initiated 
and by 2008 Egypt’s average of the nine commodity shares exceeded that of Jordan’s. The data on the 
aggregate imports of Egypt and Jordan in the last two columns tell a similar story showing much more 
rapid growth in the imports from Jordan immediately after the initiation of its QIZ, but then peaking in 
in 2006. US imports from Egypt jumped sharply after its QIZ was initiated in 2005. By and large, 
therefore the findings for the shares in the first two columns are consistent with the econometric 
findings of Table 4 as well as the patterns with respect to total imports of the US from these two 
countries in the last two columns. Note that aggregate US imports from Jordan prior to the 
establishment of its QIZ in 1999 were less than $30 million, but grew by more than 40 fold to a peak of 
$1422 million by 2006. Prior to the QIZs Egypt’s aggregate exports to the US were 20 times as large as 
those from Jordan. Despite the decline in US imports from Jordan after 2006, in the last few years US 
aggregate imports from Egypt have been only two or three times those of Jordan .  
What is more consistent with our expectation of a stronger and more sustainable increase from 
the Egyptian QIZ, however, is that, while the imports from Jordan peaked in 2006 and even by 2012 
are still at least 30% below their 2006 peak, by contrast imports from Egypt in 2012 were well above 
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their 2006 levels (just before the effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009). In absolute terms, 
moreover, they are more than double those of Jordan.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
 In this concluding section we return to the four questions posed in our Introduction. 
With respect to question (1) about the possibility of identifying significant effects of the various 
preferential trading arrangements on the country specific shares in US imports of the nine commodities 
under study, we have found evidence in Tables 2-4 of positive effects in the case of the preferential 
arrangements as a whole, and of the lesser known QIZs of both Egypt and Jordan, but not in those of 
the sub-Saharan African countries integrated into AGOA. The findings for the individual commodity 
shares of the QIZs of Egypt and Jordan seem also consistent with data on the aggregate imports of the 
US from these countries in Table 5.  
Relative to question (2) we most definitely find evidence in the form of the positive linear and 
negative nonlinear terms that the strength of these effects vary over time, rising with the years in which 
they have been in effect up to a point but then declining after that. Roughly speaking 8-12 years would 
seem to be the turning point wherein, without further changes, the preferential trading arrangements 
turn from net positive to net negative on the country shares of these commodity imports.  These 
nonlinearities in effects are evident in all cases. Without nonlinearities in the effect of years in effect, 
the estimates of the linear effects are in each case statistically insignificant. For the agreements as a 
whole see column (4) of Tables 2 and (3), for those of both the QIZs and AGOA see column (4) of 
Table 3 and of the Egyptian and Jordanian QIZs alone see columns (2) and (4) of Table 4. This finding 
has methodological implications as well. Since linear specifications are simplest and common, it would 
seem that studies using only linear models of this sort might have concluded prematurely that such 
trading agreements have no significant effects on exports in comparable types of trade outcomes.  
With respect to question (3) about the effects of Quotas and especially of the ending of the 
quotas, we see rather strong effects of EndQuota, RegularQuotaVariation and ChinaQuotaVariation in 
all three tables. Indeed, the shares of imports from all non-Quota countries are reduced substantially 
after the ending of the quotas, while those of countries formerly subject to quotas were increased 
significantly. Note that these effects are quite large, implying that the preferential access during the 
period in which quotas were in effect on garments would have been especially strong. Yet, since the 
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various Quota terms are largely dummy variables, their coefficients are not exactly comparable with 
those of the number of years in which the trade Agreements have been in effect.  
Finally, with respect to question (4) and the expectation that the proliferation of preferential 
agreements that the US has struck with various countries would have a weakening effect, in none of the 
tables was there a single incidence of a negative and significant effect of the variable constructed to 
capture that effect, namely lagCTANFTA. Indeed, in all cases the coefficients of this variable were 
positive but not significant. This finding might well be attributable to that rather steady rise in US 
imports combined with the gradual decline or disappearance of imports into the US from various other 
countries not included in the sample because of the absence of imports of these commodities in recent 
years. 
A potentially important issue that could be raised is that of the possible endogeneity of 
participation in the various preferential trade agreements investigated. Our first defense is a rather 
general one that especially from the US perspective, the purposes for joining or offering such 
preferential arrangements are usually top-down based on strategic objectives. For example, in the case 
of the QIZ the motive was largely one of the promotion of peace and normalization among former 
combatants. These motives were important not only in the case of the QIZs but also the Middle East 
peace and democracy objectives which were behind the US initiatives to establish FTAs throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa (which happened to come into fruition in Morocco, Oman and Bahrain as 
well). Our second defense is that we are focusing on only a handful of commodities which hardly could 
have been very important among the objectives of the different parties to these trading arrangements. A 
third defense of our case for lack of endogeneity in the choice of FTAs is that our choice of 
commodities was based on the combination of labor intensity and high tariff rates. As has been noted 
above, especially in the case of Jordan and the AGOA arrangements, since there was essentially no 
existing garments exporting industries in these countries to start with, there would be virtually no way 
for any relevant interest group like an association of clothing manufacturers to exercise influence in the 
creation of these preferential access agreements to the US market. By the same token, there would seem 
to be no interest group of clothing buyers that would exercise pressure in the US. Labor unions, 
moreover, have generally been steadily opposed to such agreements.     
 Still another reason for believing that the estimates of the trade creation effects estimated 
here of the preferential trade agreements are at least reasonably indicative of the order of 
magnitude and direction of effects is that the estimates obtained have also been found to be 
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robust not simply to the different specifications utilized in the paper but also to others not shown, 
such as to the use of alternative specifications of lags or in the choice of commodities and 
estimation methods (such as the use of seemingly unrelated regression estimates). An important 
future step to strengthen the significance of these results is to cluster the standard errors by 
country. 
 Finally, given the very special features and objectives of the QIZs that have required trade and 
cooperation among businessmen in formerly warring countries, we feel that the positive trade creation 
effects observed in our research underscore the potential for business initiatives to contribute to a wide 
variety of benefits, especially the goal of achieving peace. Nugent (2014) and Nugent and Abdel-Latif 
(2011) offer suggestions as to how strengthen the hoped for peace and normalization benefits that have 
not yet proved to be very successful. Further research into the reasons why the trade-creation effects of 
existing FTAs and QIZs seem to diminish over time is clearly justified.      
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Table 1  Descriptive  Statistics  
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Table 2  Determinants of Changing Country Shares in US Imports with All  Trade Agreement 
Combined 
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Table 3 Determinants of Changing Country Shares in US Imports with QIZ and AGOA 
Distinguished 
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Table 4 Determinants of Changing Country Shares in US Imports with the Two QIZs Separated 
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Table 5 Average Shares of Jordan and Egypt in US Imports of the selected Commodities and 
Total US Imports from these Countries  
Year Average 
Share of 
Jordan (in %) 
Average Share 
of Egypt 
(in %) 
Total Imports from 
Jordan (in millions 
of US Dollars) 
Total Imports from 
Egypt (in millions of 
US Dollars) 
1992 0.004 0.676 18.1 434 
1993 0.003 0.611 18.7 613 
1994 0.010 0.517 29 549 
1995 0.005 0.598 29 606 
1996 0.009 0.586 25 680 
1997 0.006 0.511 25 658 
1998 0.009 0.466 16 661 
1999 0.007 0.433 31 618 
2000 0.337 0.423 73 888 
2001 0.748 0.405 229 882 
2002 0.838 0.633 370 1356 
2003 1.239 0.598 674 1143 
2004 2.267 0.600 1093 1284 
2005 2.514 1.840 1267 2091 
2006 2.412 1.930 1422 2396 
2007 2.323 2.006 1329 2377 
2008 1.676 1.994 1138 2370 
2009 1.142 1.906 924 2058 
2010 0.934 2.044 974 2238 
2011 1.004 2.017 1061 2059 
2012 1.080 1.916 1156 3000 
Source : http:/www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5110.html 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1: Identities of the Nine Six Digit HS Codes of US Imports  and the 38 Countries included 
in Our Sample 
 
HS Codes: 
610462 - Women's or Girls' Trousers, Breeches, of Cotton, Knitted or Crocheted 
610469 - Women's or Girls' Trousers, Breeches of Other Textile Materials 
610610 - Women's or Girls' Blouses, Shirts, of Cotton, Knitted or Crocheted 
610910 - T-shirts, Singlets, Other Vests, Knitted or Crocheted, of Cotton 
611420 - Other Garments of Cotton, Knitted or Crocheted 
620342 - Men's or Boys' Trousers, Overalls, Breeches, of Cotton 
620452 - Women's or Girls' Skirts, Divided Skirts, of Cotton 
620462 - Women's or Girls' Trousers, Breeches, of Cotton 
621142 - Other Garments, Women's or Girls', of Cotton 
 
Countries and Whether or Not They have been Subject to Quotas on Imports to the US or had 
Exemptions from Tariffs and Quotas Due to Trade Agreements with the US  
Number Country FTA Quota 
0 Australia X  
1 Bahrain X  
2 Bangladesh  X 
3 Cambodia  X 
4 Canada X  
5 Chile X  
6 China  X 
7 Hong Kong  X 
8 Macao  X 
9 Colombia X  
10 Costa Rica X  
11 Dominican Republic  X 
12 Egypt QIZ  
13 El Salvador X  
14 Ghana AGOA  
15 Guatemala X  
16 Honduras X  
17 India  X 
18 Indonesia  X 
19 Israel X  
20 Jordan QIZ, FTA  
21 Kenya AGOA  
22 Lesotho AGOA  
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23 Malaysia  X 
24 Mauritius  X 
25 Mexico X  
26 Morocco X  
27 Nigeria AGOA  
28 Oman X  
29 Pakistan  X 
30 Panama X  
31 Peru X  
32 Singapore X  
33 Swaziland AGOA  
34 Tunisia   
35 Turkey   
36 Uganda AGOA  
37 Vietnam  X 
 
 
Notes 
 
UN Comtrade: 
The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) contains detailed 
imports and exports statistics reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or areas. 
It concerns annual trade data from 1962 to the most recent year. UN Comtrade is considered the 
most comprehensive trade database available with more than 1 billion records. A typical record 
is – for instance – the exports of cars from Germany to the United States in 2004 in terms of 
value (US dollars), weight and supplementary quantity (number of cars). The database is 
continuously updated. Whenever trade data are received from the national authorities, they are 
standardized by the UN Statistics Division and then added to UN Comtrade. 
 
Share Determination: 
Shares of exports to the US in each commodity were determined by first acquiring annual Trade 
Value data in terms of USD reported as imports by the US from each country in the set. Each 
countries’ value was then divided by the value of World exports to the US. All of this data was 
acquired from the UN Comtrade Database. 
 
Open Determination: 
Openness data was pulled from the Penn World Tables. Openness at current prices. Exports plus 
Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The export and import figures 
are in national currencies from the World Bank and United Nations data archives. Note that 
when the export and import figures and GDP are expressed in real values, the value of OPENC 
will be the same because the price level (conversion factor) for DA and exports and imports is 
the same.  
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Quotas: 
Quotas were imposed by US and Europe to protect their industries through 2001. The quotas 
were gradually relaxed until 2005. 
 
China Specific Quota: 
China retained a partial quota on 20% of its products from 2005 to 2008. We created a separate 
dummy and series for China for this reason. 
 
NFTA: 
A variable which counts the number of trade agreements (FTAs, AGOA, QIZ) in place for a 
given year among the countries included in our data. 
 
AGOA: 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act was approved by the US Congress in 2000 with the 
intention of assisting the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. The eligibility criteria were intended 
to improve labor rights and promote a market-based economy. The criteria evolve on an annual 
basis. In order to be eligible for the apparel specific provision, a country must have implemented 
an American compliant visa system. 
 
QIZ: 
Qualifying Industrial Zones are special free trade zones within Egypt and Jordan which allow 
tariff and quota free access to US markets if a minimum of 35% value added occurs in Israel. 
The intention of the agreements was promotion of peace, as well as fostering economic ties 
between Israel and other countries in the region. 
 
